THE INFLUENCE OF AUDIT FEE, AUDIT TIME BUDGET PRESSURE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT ATTITUDE ON THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR AND IT'S IMPLICATION ON AUDIT QUALITY SURVEY ON "SMALL" SCALE PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM'S IN JAVA

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ABSTRACT

The fierce competition among public accounting firm encourages competitive biddings which lead "fee war" that effect the audit fee. It consequently brings implications to the audit time budget pressure that will cause public accountants dysfunctional behavior and attitude in performing the public accountant duties which results in poor audit quality.

Objects of study is the audit fee, audit time budget pressure, public accountans attitude, public accountans dysfunctional, and audit quality. The research methods used on this case is descriptive –verificative methods. Research type is applied reseach. The data were obtained through survey techniques by distributing questionnaires to 167 public accounting firms small scale in Java and examined by structural equation model.

The result showed that there were a significant effect of the audit fees, audit time budget pressure to public accountans attitude. The audit time budget pressure and public accountans attitude also had significant effects on public accountant dysfunctional behavior and it's can implicate the increase of audit quality.

Field of Research : *Audit Fee, Audit Time Budget Pressure, Public Accountants Attitude, Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior, Audit Quality.*

1. Introduction

Public Accounting firms has face the fierce competition in offering audit services (Carson, et al., 2004) and at the end most of the impact of this competition lead to offering a competitive bidding, so the client can choose Public Accounting Firms easly (Cook dan Kelly, 1991).The Effect of competitive bidding is hard price-bargains between public accounting firms, that occured in Small Scale Public Accounting Firms in Jakarta, where the offering fee of public accounting firms more lower than before (Fuad Rachmany, 2005). The Lower Audit Fee or significantly lower than audit fee before will raise a doubtness about the ability of Public Accounting Firms in applying the profesional standars and technical standard (Tia, 2008), so this issues is important because it relates to a competition concern in audit market (Carson, et al., 2004).

Albercht (2010) provide an explanation of arising issues from the audit fee is the price competition, the price competition give an affect at the time owned by the auditor to conduct an audit, there will be less testing and limitation of collection evidence. these conditions according to Robbins and Judge (2009:208) can create "time pressure for Public Accountant and often complicate to collect all information that public accountas want to before making a final choice". Other problems that arise according to Albrecht (2010) is the presence of new pressures because rely on public accountant low paid, where less professionalism and experience, so according to Jensen and Payne (2005), it might be a concerns about the possible existence of an audit fee competition that erodes of audit quality.

Audit time budget pressure is the other efect of c*ompetitive Bidding to* Public Accounting firms besides the decresase of audit fees (Cook and Kelly,1991). Audit time budget become important to Public Accounting firms because it is the basis to set audit fee, to chose their employee to do the auditting and to evaluate the performance of public accountants. Robbins and Judge (2009 : 208) state that audit time budget is needed to Public Accounting firms to decide many thing in auditting, in the fierce competition some of decision must be taken fast to still stay ahead and fulfill the client expectations, almost important decision is followed by the right and correct time budget. Hendry Simamora (2002:30) state that time audit can help finish the audit bondaries in reasonable time and can create good reputation to public acountants through good and qualified work. Albercht (2010) explained the problem that emerged in fee audit is fee competion that has effect auditor time audit, there is a limitles test and colleting evidence. These condition above according to Robbins and Judge (2009:208) can create time pressure to public accountant and often difficult to collect the whole information that the public accountants have before they make final decision. The other problem that emerged according to Albercht (2010) there is a new pressure because of hiring the cheap auditor, that less exprecience and non profesinalism, so that according to jensen and payne (2005) these fee audit competition it migt be worrying that it can erodes the quality of audit

Based on the explanation above that the reduced of audit fees can cause time budget pressure audit, this will lead to an attitude that must be performed by public accountants. Ethical dilemma is a situation faced by a person where the Public Accountant must make decisions about the appropriate behavior to do (Arens, et al., 2012:112). Malone and Roberts (1996) states, individual behavior is a reflection of the personality while situational factors that occur will encourage someone to make a decision, so it can be concluded (Donnelly, et al., 2003) that dysfunctional audit behavior can be caused by factors personal characteristics of auditors (internal factors) as well as situational factors when performing audits (external factors), according to Donnelly, et al., (2003) auditor dysfunctional behavior continued and evolving and already at a very disturbing (Otley and Pierce, 1995) at the auditor profession.

The conditions of auditor are depressed because of the tend audit time budgets that can dysfunctional behave by making premature sign-offs, such as too convinced on client explanation and presentation, failed to investigate relevant issues, acquisition of a lack of evidence, audit processing is less accurate, and errors in the audit stage, which is produce the audit reports with low quality (Donnelly, et al., 2003). Cook and Kelly (1991) adds that dysfunctional behavior tends to increase proportionaly with the increasing of audit time budget pressure. Donnelly, et al., (2003) also suggested that public accountant dysfunctional behavior in public accountant that affects to audit quality directly is premature sign off, while underreporting off time is indirectly affect the audit quality. Still according to Donnelly, et al., (2003) states that public accountant dysfunctional behavior associated with audit quality reduce.

The Other effects of competitive bidding is not qualified audit. According to Jansen and Payne (2005) audit fees that arising from the audit market competition affects the audit quality, although the increasing audit quality are generally not accompanied by appearance of the high audit fees. Hendry Simamora (2002:15) asserts that the client who pays the service fee auditors, but auditors independent of the client, as already stipulated in the general standard, so as to produce a audit quality. Nor and Smith (2009) states the auditors do the work according to the commitment that interested in the audit quality.

Nor and Smith (2009) describe that audit quality is very important, not only for clients or for Public Accounting firms it's self, but also for the public. Audit Quality is a fundamental element that explains the demand of audit services (Nor and Smith, 2009). Audit quality is not defined in standards auditing, the normal audit process produces only a minimal audit report as a form standard but it not contains more information about the audit quality (Zerni, 2009). Public Accountant Bulletin (2010), stated that the auditing standards guidance also only regulate what should be done in the process of auditing and the obedience to the standars that will indicated to the audit has been conducted on the level of acceptable quality. Besides describing audit risk, audit quality also asses the aspects of knowledge, skills, audit planning, timeliness, adequacy, independence (Hillison, et al., 2004).


Similiarly, according to De'Angelo (1981) Audit Quality is determined by two things, namely the ability of auditors to find / detect violations that occur in the client's accounting system, and the ability to report the violations that it found. Riley (2001) provide an explanation further more to the auditor quality, that is multidimensional and inherently unobservable, and there is no single characteristic of the auditor which can be used as a proxy for assessing the audit quality, as an indicator to measure quality directly, we must access the quality using quality surrogates, or the overall reputation of the auditor.

2. Theoretical Framework

Audit Fee is a source of income for Public Accounting firms, (Arens et al, 2012). Tia (2008) states that the fee associated with the amount of time used to complete the work, the value of services rendered to clients or for Public Accounting firms concerned, while Hendry Simamora (2002:143) states that "the management of time is an important consideration because the bill of the audit fee to the client's often based on the amount of audit time charged to engagement", Bierstaker & Wright (2001) states that "Auditors face significant pressure due to reduced Audit Fee, still according Bierstaker & Wright (2001) and DeZoort (1997) states that" The negative impact of the competitive is reduced to time for audit the effect of reduced audit fee". This is the same with Collier & Gregory (1996), if the Audit Fee is not reduced then the time to audit was not reduced, while Cook & Kelly (1991) states that "The lower of Fee offset by the reduced audit time budget". Reduction of audit time budget can be a source of pressure, McNamara (2008).

The audit time budget has the potential to create pressure because this action is not only as a control mechanism, but also a tool of performance measurement in the Public Accounting firms (Liyanarachchi, 2007), audit time budget pressures tends to increase proportional with public accountant dysfunctional behavior (Cook & Kelly, 1991), audit time budget pressure is one of the main causes of public accountants dysfunctional behavior (Kelley and Margheim, 1990). DeZoort (1997) suggests that one effect of the Audit Time Budget Pressure is attitude. One of attitudes conducted by the Public Accountants as Audit Time Budget set too tight, it can lead to Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior (McNamara, 2008).

DeZoort (1997) suggests dysfunctional behaviors are strongly associated with the audit time budget pressure and have an impact on audit quality, while the achievement of audit time budget is the most important component of performance evaluation (Cook & Kelly, 1991). Public Accountants tend to dysfunctional behavior because it is under audit time budget pressure, and the impact of the risk of premature termination of the practice of signing off on audit procedures carried out by public accountants, especially in conditions of time pressure (Coram, 2004). Strength and quality control review procedures related to audit quality while the failure of public accountants to perform the steps correctly audit showed acts reduced audit quality (Malone and Robert, 1996).
Framework based on the description above, it can be described in the diagram of mind mapping as follows:



Picture 1
Mindset

3. Hypothesis

Based on the framework above, it can be formulated several hypotheses in this study, namely:

Hypothesis1: : Audit Fee influence the Audit Time Budget Pressure.

Hypothesis2: : Audit Time Budget Pressure influence the Public Accountants Attitude

Hypothesis3: : Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountant Attitudes influence the Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior either simultaneously or partialy.

Hypothesis4: : Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior influence the Audit Quality either simultaneously or partialy.

4. Research Methods

The research methods used on this case is descriptive –verificative methods and research type is applied reseach, andthen unit analysis of this study is the "small" scale Public Accounting firms, which has a maximum of 3 partner (Mustafa, 2009). The "small" scale public accountans firm in Java amounted to 269 units (according to the directory of Public Accounting firms (2010) arranged by Indonesian institute of public accountants and cooperated with the head secretary general department of treasury rebuplic of Indonesia and the devolepment of accountant and services accesor). This Research is using random sampling in each city with stratifield random sampling techniques , the number of this sample is selected using slovin equation (Husein, 2005:78) :

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N.(e)^2}$$

source: Husein Umar

information :

n = sample dimension
N = population
e = derajat kesalahan yang masih dalam batas toleransi diambil 5%.

According to slovin equation , the number of minimun sample public accountants office in Java :

$$n = \frac{269}{1 + 269\ (0.05)^2} = 160{,}1 \approx 161$$

from 161 sample, there is 167 The "small" scale Public Accounting firms, while the observation units are senior in charge that has more time budget pressure (Cook&Kelly,1991) than the other level, similar as raghunatan (1991) time budget pressure is the hard stage for senior level, at the other hand many accountant agreed that the most stress profession is public accountants while the partner has low stress (Sanders,1995). The test instrument is using *Structural Equation Model*.

The next step is variable operational. This stage is consept operationalization so it can be observered dan measured by the researcher. The operationalization is conducted by the seeing the behavior indicator or the nature of consept. In the other words, consept operationalization is characterstic identification of the consept. Further more, it called as a variable.

Before the operationalization of this research variable, first the variable must be identified as shown below:

1. Audit Fee
   Audit Fee variable (X_1) = *senior in charge*, that will have fee from client through their partner based on the time budget prediction to finish their work in auditing until they give the report to the client. This variable is measured by the indicator that has been developed by Arens, et al., (2012), Hendry (2002), Bierstaker and Wright (2001), DeZoort (1997), The calculation generates 1 dimension with 3 indicator
2. Audit time budget pressure
   Audit time budget pressure variable (X_2) = one type of pressure that public accountants must have faced and it must be considered seriously during auditing process. This variable is measured by the indicator that developed by Liyanarachchi (2007), Coram, et al., (2004) dan DeZoort (1997). The calculation generates 1 dimension with 2 indicator.
3. Public Accountant Attitude
   Public Accountant Attitude variable (X_3) = The tendency to answer or to respon. Attitude is not a behavior, but it is the reaction to answer or to respon that lead some one to behave. This variable is measured by the indicator that developed by Schermerhorn, et al., (2005), Robbins and Judge (2009), Siegel and Marconi (1989). The calculation generates 2 dimension with 3 indicator.
4. Public Accountants Dysfunctional Behaviour
   Public Accountants Dysfunctional Behaviour variable (Y) = the conduct of not supporting goal achievement (Gibson, et al., 2006), such as not followed procedural audit that appropriate on SPAP standards
   (non procedural audit), do the over time and accepted the client reason easily. This variable is measured by the indicator that developed by Gibson, et al., (2006), Kinichi and Kreitner (2003), Dezort (1997), Kelly dan Margheim (1990), Raghunathan (1991). The calculation generates 1 dimension with 3 indicator.
5. Audit Quality
   Audit Quality variable (Z) = ussually related to qualification skill, completion work in proper time, the adequacy of competence evidence investigation in the lowest cost, as well as the independency attitude to the client (Basuki,2006). This variable is measured by the indicator that developed by DeAngelo (1981), Wooten (2003), Basuki (2006), Boon and Mc Kinnon (2008) as well as GAO. The calculation generates 9 dimension with 12 indicator.

This research is using questioner techniques to collect data, the seriousness of respondents in answering the questions becomes important. Because of that the data must be tested properly to produces valid data, if the instrument of test is not valid and not be trusted, so that research results can not explain the real condition, there is 2 type of test to know the seriousness of respondent answer which is *test of validity* and *test of reliability.* The next step is to test suitability of the models or *Goodness of Fit using Robust Maximum Likelihood* Estimation methods. The test result has shown the models can be accepted, it means the models can be used to test the research hypothesis (see table 1).


Tabel 1
The test result of the suitability models

Goodness of Fit dimension	**Estimation result value**
Chi-Square	554,73 (*p-value* = 0,000)
RMSEA	0,094*
GFI	0,776
AGFI	0,724
NFI	0,955*
CFI	0,973*
IFI	0,973*
RFI	0,949*
PNFI	0,846
PGFI	0,630

Sumber : appendix. output Lisrel (SEM) * good criteria

5. Result and Discussion

The test research hypothesis is modelling the *exogenous* laten variable related to *endogenous* laten variable or the relation of *endogenous* variable with the other *endogenous* variable. The test is using (SEM) structural equation models, that shown Standardization coefisien of structural equation model (see picture 1)



Source : appendix. output Lisrel (SEM)

Picture 1
Standardization coefisien of structural equation models

And the test result statistic resume from using SEM can be shown in table 2

Table 2
The Test Result Statistic Resume

Sub Structure	Path	coefisien	T_{count}*	R-Square
first	$\xi_1 \rightarrow \xi_2$	-0,4718	-5,7230	0,2226
second	$\xi_2 \rightarrow \xi_3$	-0,4509	-4,9612	0,2034
third	$\xi_2 \rightarrow \eta_1$	0,3781	4,1975	0,6379
	$\xi_3 \rightarrow \eta_1$	-0,5534	-6,6653	
fourth	$\xi_2 \rightarrow \eta_2$	-0,1838	-2,0552	0,7290
	$\eta_1 \rightarrow \eta_2$	-0,7264	-8,7434	

Source :. Appendix . output Lisrel (SEM) *$t_{critical}$= 1,96

5.1 The Influence of Audit Fee on the Audit Time Budget Pressure

Hipotesis:

$H_0 : \gamma_{1.1} = 0$ Audit Fee hasn't influenced the Audit Time Budget Pressure on The "small" scale Public Accounting Firms in Java

Ha : $\gamma 1.1 \neq 0$ Audit Fee has influenced the Audit Time Budget Pressure on The "small" scale Public Accounting Firms in Java

Table 3
Test Results of The Influence of Audit fees on Audit Time Budget Pressure

Koef. Jalur	T_{count}	$T_{criticism}$	Ho	Ha
-0,4718	-5,7230	1,96	Rejected	Accepted

Based on the test results, it can be seen that the value t_{count} of audit fee variable (-5.7230) is smaller than negative $t_{criticism}$ (-1.96), then the error rate of 5% so it was decided to reject Ho, and accepted Ha. So based on test results (95% confidence level) it can be concluded that the Audit Fee influence to Audit Time Budget Pressure on The "small" scale public accounting firms in Java that means A very high paced competition between Public Accounting firms encourage competitive bidding among Public Accounting firms thus resulting in "hard – priced bargains", as one a Public Accounting firms located in Jakarta, offering a lower fee than the previous Public Accounting firms (Fuad Rachmany, 2005).

Generally, the effect of " hard – priced bargains" that is felt by the senior in charge associated to the Audit Fee to conduct field work to the preparation of draft audit reports and audit fee rate is obtained as an auditor at the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java. It can be categorized "sufficient", where the Audit Fee accounted for 22.26% of the Audit Time Budget pressure on The "small" scale public accounting firms in Java.

The explanation above is the same comment as Bierstaker & Wright (2001) and DeZoort (1997) states that "The negative impact of the bidding and the audit time budget pressure describe as the effects of the decline of Audit Fee". Also with Collier & Gregory (1996) and Cook & Kelly (1991), a reduced in audit fees, offset by increased audit time budget pressure. The reduction of audit time budget can be a source of pressure, McNamara (2008). Bierstaker & Wright (2001) states that "Auditors face significant pressure due to the falling of Audit Fee". So the conclusion can be describe : Audit Fee affect to Audit Time Budget Pressure. Audit fees negatively affect audit time budget pressure, it means the less of audit fee, it will increase audit time budget pressure on the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java.

5.2 The Influence of Audit Time Budget Pressure to the Public Accountant Attitude

Hipotesis:

$H_0 : \gamma_{2.1} = 0$ Audit Time Budget Pressure hasn't influenced the Public Accountans Attitude on the "small" scale Public Accounting Firms in Java.

$Ha : \gamma_{2.1} \neq 0$ Audit Time Budget Pressure has influenced the Public Accountans Attitude on the "small" scale Public Accounting Firms in Java

Table 4
Test Results of the Influence of Audit Time Budget Pressure on Public Accountant Attitudes

Koef. Jalur	T_{count}	$T_{critism}$	Ho	Ha
-0,4509	-4,9612	1,96	Rejected	Accepted

Based on the test results, it can be seen the value of the variable pressure t_{count} audit deadline (-4.9612) is smaller than negative $t_{criticism}$ (-1.96), then the error rate of 5% so it was decided to reject Ho, and accepted Ha. So based on test results (95% confidence level) it can be concluded that the Audit Time Budget Pressure affect the public accountans attitude on The "small" scale public accounting firms in Java. It means commonly public accountant do the auditing at end of the year and more less at the time of interim audit (interviews with three senior auditor in Bandung), a senior in charge feel the time which has been determined to complete the audit within a very tight budget in recent years can be achieved in doubt, although some are able to achieve it and the impact of a very limited time budget tight at the time of the audit, the senior in charge experiencing a state of "depressed", although in a state of "distress" the senior in charge, keep working on the audit in accordance with the procedures and the work was brought to the house (positive attitude). Where the Audit Time Budget Pressure contributed 20.34% of public accountant attitudes on the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java.

The explanation above is the same comment as DeZoort (1997) time budget audit will give pressure that might impact on attitude and public accountants behavior who are conducting an audit, while according to Donnelly, et al., (2003) states that the auditor will experience stress when faced with a situation of time budget during the auditing . Hendry Simamora (2002.144) reveals "The presence of an unexpected situation, even though the Budget time estimate can be completed in accordance with the audit engagement should not be any compromise to the quantitative standards in the implementation of standard work field," meaning that the auditor should behave according to the rules in the field of work when doing the audit. So the conclusion can be describe : The audit time budget pressure affect the public accountant attitude, where the reduced of audit time budget pressures will make a public accountant attitude more positive at the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java, otherwise.

5.3 The influence of Audit Time Budget Pressure and public accountant Attitudes to the Public Accountants Dysfunctional Behavior

1) The influence of Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountant Attitudes to the Public Accountants Dysfunctional Behavior

Hipotesis:

$H_0 :$ Semua $\gamma_{3.i} = 0$, $i = 1,2$ Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountant Attitude jointly hasn't influenced Public accountant Dysfunctional Behavior on the "small" scale Public Accounting firms in Java

$Ha :$ Ada $\gamma_{3.i} \neq 0$, $i = 1,2$ Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountant Attitude jointly have influenced Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior on the "small" scale Public Accounting firms in Java

The test of hypothesis is using the F test statistic to reject Ho if the provision is F_{count} greater than F_{table}, or otherwise accept Ho if F_{count} less than or equal to F_{table}. Through the value of the coefficient of determination (R^2value) can be calculated the value of F by the following formula.

$$F_{count} = \frac{(n-k-1)R^2_{Y(X_1X_2)}}{k(1-R^2_{Y(X_1X_2)})}$$

$$F_{hitung} = \frac{(167-2-1)\times 0,6379}{2\times(1-0,6379)}$$

$$= 144,457$$

From F_{table} for a significance level of 0.05 and the free degrees (2; 164) F_{table} values was obtained at 3.051, because of the research results F_{count} value (144.457) and greater than F_{table} (3.051), then the error rate of 5% so it was decided to reject Ho and received Ha. Based on the test results with 95% confidence level , we can conclude that audit time budget pressures and the public accountants attitudes together significant effect on the public accountant dysfunctional behavior at the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java. It means both of the Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountant Attitudes have an account for 63.79% of the public Accountants dysfunctional behavior, the exogenous and endogenous variables between the two public accountants attitude of providing are greater contribution in the amount of 30.60% than the audit time budget pressure (14.30%) of the public accountant dysfunctional behavior.

This explanation is the same comment as De Zoort (1997) suggests that one of the effect of audit time budget pressure is the attitude of the public accountants, when the time budget is set too tight, and implicated to the dysfunctional behavior of the public accountants (McNamara 2008), The attitudes has influenced the dysfunctional behavior and implicated to the accountants profession (Donnelly, et al., 2003).

2) The influence of Audit Time Budget Pressure partially to The Public Accountants Dysfunctional Behavior

Hipotesis:

$H_0 : \gamma_{3.1} = 0$ Audit Time Budget Pressure hasn't influenced partially the Public Accountant Dysfunctional on the "small" scale Public Accounting firms in Java

$Ha : \gamma_{3.1} \neq 0$ Audit Time Budget Pressure has influenced partially the Public Accountant Dysfunctional on the "small" scale Public Accounting Firms in Java

Table 5
Test Results of the influence of Audit Time Budget Pressure to Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior

Koef. Jalur	**T_{count}**	**$T_{criticism}$**	**Ho**	**Ha**
0,3781	4,1975	1,96	rejected	accepted

Based on the test results , the value of the variable t_{count} audit time budget pressure (4.1975) is greater than $t_{criticism}$ (1.96), because the value is t_{count} greater than $t_{criticism}$, then the 5 % error rate , it was decided to reject Ho and accepted Ha. Based on test results with 95% of level confidence, we can conclude that the Audit Time Budget Pressure partially affect the public accountants Dysfunctional Behavior on the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java. It means commonly public accountant do the auditing at end of the year and more less at the time of interim audit. These conditions has caused the senior in charge "depressed", because of that, the senior in charge finally has brought the work to their home. It means the senior in charge has done the dysfunctional behavior in "low" conditions. Audit time budget pressures directly has contributed (14.30%) to the public accountant dysfunctional behavior.

The explanation is the same comment as the McNamara (2008) which states that the audit time budget pressure has a significant influence on the public accountant dysfunctional behavior. Audit time budget has the potential to

create pressure for this action, not only as a control mechanism, but also performance measurement tool in the public accounting firms (Liyanarachchi, 2007), the Budget is likely to increase audit time is proportional to the increasing public accountant dysfunctional behavior (Cook and Kelly, 1991), time budget pressure is one of the main causes of public accountant dysfunctional behavior (Kelley & Margheim, 1990). The conclusion of this results : the audit time budget pressures partially influence the public accountant dysfunctional behavior, audit time budget pressure had a positive influence on the of public accountant dysfunctional behavior, where the greater the pressure will increase the audit time budget of dysfunctional behavior on the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java, and otherwise.

3) The Influence of Public Accountant Attitudes partially to Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior

Hipotesis:

$H_0 : \gamma_{3.2} = 0$ Public Accountant Attitude hasn't influenced partially the Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior on the "small" scale Public Accounting Firms in Java.

$Ha : \gamma_{3.2} \neq 0$ Public Accountant Attitude has influenced partially the Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior on the "small" scale Public Accounting Firms in Java

Table 6
Test Results of the Influence Public Accountant Attitudes to Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior

Koef. Jalur	**T_{count}**	**$T_{criticism}$**	**Ho**	**Ha**
-0,5534	-6,6653	1,96	rejected	Accepted

Based on the test results, the value of the variable public accountant attitude t_{count} (-6.6653) is smaller than negative $t_{criticism}$ (-1.96), then the 5% error rate so it was decided to reject Ho and accepted Ha. Based on test results with 95% of level confidence we can conclude that the public accountants attitude affect partially the public accountant dysfunctional behavior on the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java. It means that many of them only as a irregularities justification for their client (Anwar Nasution, 2006). These conditions has caused the senior in charge generraly do the premature sign off, such as receive auditees reasons sometimes which usually can not be accepted easily because of the limitness of the time audit, although the senior in charge has always it has always follows the procedures of SPAP and always takes overtime when he need more time. It means the senior in charge has done the dysfunctional behavior in "low" conditions.

The explanation is same comment as statement Gibson, et al., (2006), Schermerhorn, et al., (2005), Robbins (2005) and Siegel and Marconi (1989) which states that "attitude is a tendency to respond positively to feeling good and negative". Arfan and Ishak (2008: 44) states that "In the public accounting firms the attitude is important because it affects to work public accountant attitude ". The conclusion of this results is that Public Accountants attitude affected the public accountant dysfunctional behavior, a positive public accountant attitude will reduce public accountant dysfunctional behavior on the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java. The dysfunctional emerged when there is a pressure to behave in certain ways that have incredible power, of course, no individual can completely avoid this mismatch.

5.4 The influence of audit time budget pressure and public accountant dysfunctional behavior to the Audit Quality

1) The influence of Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountants Dysfunctional Behavior to The audit quality

Hipotesis:

$H_0 : \gamma_{4.1} \& \beta_{2.1} = 0$ Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountant Dysfunctional behavior haven't influenced the Audit Quality on the "small" scale Public Accounting Firms in Java

Ha : $\gamma_{4.1} \& \beta_{2.1} \neq 0$ Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountant Dysfunctional behavior have influenced the Audit Quality on the "small" scale Public Accounting Firm's in Java

The test of hypothesis is using the F test statistic to reject Ho if the provision is F_{count} greater than F_{table}, or otherwise accept Ho if F_{count} less than or equal to F_{table}, through the coefficient of determination (R^2value) can be calculated the value of F by the following formula.

$$F_{count} = \frac{(n-k-1)R^2_{Y(X_1X_2)}}{k(1-R^2_{Y(X_1X_2)})}$$

$$F_{hitung} = \frac{(167-2-1)\times 0,7290}{2\times(1-0,7290)}$$

$$= 220,583$$

From F_{table} for a significance level of 0.05 and the free degrees (2; 164) F_{table} values was obtained at 3.051, because of the research results F_{count} value (220.583) and greater than F_{table} (3.051), then the error rate of 5% so it was decided to reject Ho and accepted Ha. Based on the test results with 95% confidence level , we can conclude that audit time budget pressures and the public accountant dysfunctional behavior jointly significant effect on the audit quality at the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java. It means both of the Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior have an account for 72.90% to the audit quality, from the exogenous and endogenous variables, public accountant dysfunctional behavior is the most precentage (52.77%) than the audit time budget pressure percentage (3.38%) to the audit Quality.

The explanation is the same comment as De Zoort (1997) states that "dysfunctional behavior correlates strongly with time budget pressure and have an impact on audit quality", it is the same comment with the Law (2001) which states that "Auditors must have a strategy to cope with the audit relating to the suppression time and behavior in auditing ". The pressure of time in some measure necessary to promote public accountants to work more efficiently, but excessive pressure and associated with performance evaluation will cause stress on public accountant that will trigger it to perform dysfunctional behavior and impact on audit quality (Cook and Kelly, 1991).

2) The Influence of Audit Time Budget Pressure partially to the Audit Quality

Hipotesis:

$H_0 : \gamma_{4.1} = 0$ Audit Time Budget Pressures hasn't influenced partially to the Audit Quality in the "small" scale Public Accounting Firms in Java

Ha : $\gamma_{4.1} \neq 0$ Audit Time Budget Pressures has influenced partially to the Audit Quality in the "small" scale Public Accounting Firms in Java

Table 7
Test Results of The influence of audit time budget Pressure to the audit quality

Koef. Jalur	$\mathbf{t_{hitung}}$	$\mathbf{t_{kritis}}$	**Ho**	**Ha**
-0,1838	-2,0552	1,96	rejected	be accepted

Based on the test results,the value of the variable t_{count} audit time budget pressure (-2.0552) is smaller than negative $t_{criticism}$ negative (-1.96), because the value is t_{count} smaller than the negative $t_{criticism}$, then the 5% of error rate so it was decided to reject Ho and accepted Ha. Based on the test results with 95% of confidence level, we can conclude that audit time budget pressures partially influence the audit quality on the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java. It means commonly public accountant do the auditing at end of the year and more less at the time of interim audit, these conditions has caused the senior in charge has a doubtness in attempt to

complete the audit within a very tight budget in recent years, although some are able to achieve it and then the impact of very tight budget at the audit time has caused the senior in charge "depressed", although of "the condition of depressed" senior in charge still always trying to understand the client's business & business process, capable to audit in the audit program, considerating the risk of audit, submitting timely audit reports, gather sufficient audit evidence and has competency, free from the interfere of other parties and kinship, work with the audit program, always evaluated by internal control client, although a reviewed by a third party, in this study is not optimal because sometimes the result of the review doesn't do continueously. Audit Time Budget pressure contributes to the audit quality is 3.38%.

The explanation is the same comment as (Coram et al., 2004) which states public accountant tends to audit quality make cuts because it is under audit time budget pressure. Low time Budget can lead to budget pressures experienced auditors in completing audits of time (Kelly and Margheim, 1990). Audit time budget pressures negatively impact the audit quality, that the high audit time budget pressure will reduce the audit quality on the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java or on the other way around.

2) The influence of Public Accountants Dysfunctional Behavior Partially to the Audit Quality

Hipotesis:

$H_0 : \beta_{2.1} = 0$ Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior hasn't influenced to the Audit Quality on the "small" scale Public Accounting Firm in Java

$Ha : \beta_{2.1} \neq 0$ Public Accountant Dysfunctional Behavior has influenced to the Audit Quality on the "small" scale Public Accounting Firm in Java

Table 8
Test Results of the influence of public accountants dysfunctional behavior to the audit quality

Koef. Jalur	**T_{count}**	**$T_{criticism}$**	**Ho**	**Ha**
-0,7264	-8,7434	1,96	Rejected	Accepted

Based on the test results, the value of the variable t_{count} public accountant dysfunctional behavior (-8.7434) is smaller than negative $t_{criticism}$ (-1.96). Because the value is t_{count} smaller than the negative $t_{criticism}$, then the 5% of error rate, so it was decided to reject Ho and accepted Ha. Based on test results with 95% of confidence level we can conclude that the public accountants dysfunctional behavior effect partially on the audit quality on the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java. It means that many of them only just as a irregularities justification for their client (Anwar Nasution, 2006) and therefore contributes to the audit quality, a senior in charge has done the dysfunctional behavior that is prematurely sign - off , sometimes receive the auditees reasons which usually can not be accepted easily at the tight budget of time audit. The Low time Budget can lead the auditors in to budget pressures experienced in attempt to complete the audit (Kelly and Margheim, 1990), further more premature sign-off has a direct impact on the audit quality that ultimately affect the reliability of audit reports which can form as the basis of opinion, all of the dysfunctional behavior influence on opinion, the accountant public opinion is influenced by the application of accounting GAAP and SPAP, which audit evidence depends on the control of the client, if the control is good then the auditors obtain less evidence, a senior in charge do the audits according to auditing procedures, senior in charge still always trying to understand the client's business & business process, capable to audit in the audit program, considerating the risk of audit, submitting timely audit reports, gather sufficient audit evidence and has competency, free from the interfere of other parties and kinship, work with the audit program, always evaluated by client internal control, although a reviewed by a third party, in this study is not optimal because sometimes the result of the review doesn't do continueously

6. Conclusion

Based on the formulation of the problem, developing hypotheses on the basis of theories that relate, as well as the results of the analysis that has been discussed as has been presented in previous chapters, the conclusions of this study are as follows:

1. Audit Fee influence on Audit Time Budget Pressure on the “small” scale public accounting firms in Java. Fee offered is lower than the previous public accounting firms, the results of this study stated that the received audit fee for carrying out field work to the preparation of draft audit reports and audit fee rates are obtained as an auditor is in the category of "enough" so the impact for the senior in charge is having audit time budget pressure. It means the lower audit fees will cause the audit time budget pressure.
2. Audit Time Budget Pressure influence on the public accountant attitude on the “small” scale public accounting firms in Java. In generally that the company conducted an audit at the end of the year so the time to auditing is very strict, senior in charge though in distress, he must still have the self confidence, capable to conduct an audit thus producing a positive attitude such as patient and happy to do the audit, budget pressures mean drop in audit time budget, it will generate a positive public accountant attitude.
3. Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountant Attitudes influence Public Accountant Dysfunctional behavior either jointly or partially on the “small” scale public accounting firms in Java. Many accountants work just as irregularities justification that their client committed, the audit time budget pressures will lead to an attitude that will be performed by public accountants, the attitude taken by a public accountant doing an audit remains depressed despite the happy and patient,so dysfunctional behavior in this study in the low category . It means low budget audit time, low the public accountant dysfunctional, as well as with the public accountant attitude that is more positive the public accountants attitude, so the lower the public accountant dysfunctional behavior.
4. Audit Time Budget Pressure and Public Accountants Dysfunctional Behavior influence on the “small” scale public accounting firms in Java. A lot of work just as justification public accounting firms deviation committed by client, it is done in order to exist in the conduct of business, although the audit time budget pressure but keep working on the audit so that the effect on audit quality, dysfunctional behavior in this study are premature sign sometimes off as a senior in charge accept the reasons which usually can not be accepted easily, although a senior in charge depressed but always invoke the following audit procedures and perform an audit in accordance SPAP overtime when it finds a deeper step in conducting an audit. It describes the occurrence of public accountants dysfunctional behavior in conditions of low, public accountants dysfunctional behavior can influence the opinion of the Public Accountant, so it can be concluded the lower the public accountant dysfunctional, the higher the audit quality.

7. Suggestions

Referring to the results of this study, to improve the audit quality, raised some suggestions as follows:

1. The existence of competitive bidding for public accounting firms needs to be balanced by taking into account the audit risk for audits done in the field, time management is an important consideration because the client's from audit fee is often based on the amount of time to audit the cost charged to engagement.
2. Audit time budget pressures should be addressed in a positive way because of the audit time budget is simply to work harder and use time effectively, which will ultimately increase of audit quality
3. Public Accountant dysfunctional behavior should be addressed in a positive, public accountants dysfunctional behavior is a negative behavior, but its existence can be kept to a minimum so as to produce a audit quality.
4. The necessity of doing quality review of the "small" scale public accounting firms in Java continue, so as to produce a audit quality and the merger between "small" scale public accounting in Java, so that the public accounting firms be strong and big.

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